Indian is no exception to these general
trends, with a few special features. During last two decades India’s
agricultural exports as a part of total merchandise exports have continued to
decline from the preponderant position they occupied in the pre-independence.
But with the achievement of self-sufficiency in food grains and some other
major agricultural commodities, which used to account for large portion of
import bill, overall imports of agricultural commodities have sharply declined.
The outlay on agricultural imports as a proportion of earnings from
agricultural exports has progressively declined, and all the balance has become
progressively more favourable. Discussion on these issues has, naturally, to
take into account the new trade regime as the stated objective of firstly to
study the performance of India’s agricultural exports under WTO regime.
Secondly, to analyze the competitiveness of top agri-exports of India under WTO
regime. Finally, to suggest policy measures in the identified India’s agricultural.
In the first part of discuss briefly introduce, the developments in
agricultural trade specially the agricultural exports at the world level in the
recent years and discuss the performance of Indian agriculture in this respect
finally shaped the shifts in this policy. Final part, I will try to spell out
the ingredients of a strategy to augment agricultural exports in the changing,
and more demanding, global economy.
According to
the Indian Census 2001, the share of cultivators and agriculture labourers in
the total labour force of India declined from 64.8 per cent in 1991 to 58.2 per
cent in 2001, while the share of agriculture value added in total value added
of the country dropped from 31.3 per cent to 24.5 per cent. Thus, a 6.8 per
cent shift in the output from agriculture to non-agriculture resulted in a
shift of just about 6.6 per cent labour from farming to non-farming sector. If
this were the case, then even if the share of agriculture is completely
overtaken by the other sectors, the problem of huge income inequality between
rural and urban will remain daunting. The ratio of income defining the poverty
line in urban and rural India has increased from 1.29 in 1983-84 to 1.4 in
1999-00. Nevertheless, the urban-rural income differential in India is much
smaller than that of developed countries (Table 1). In order to bridge these
inequalities, the developed countries generally tend to resort to heavy
subsidies to their agricultural sector. The rural-urban divide in India is
increasing steadily and it would have to face the same problem as other
developed countries are facing at present (Table 1). However, India could not
afford to employ the same balancing strategy as practiced by the developed
countries of providing subsidy to the agricultural sector, because its rural
population is very large.
Therefore, the solution to reduce the
rural-urban divide in India lies in employment-generating large-scale
industrialization and expansion of agriculture processing and exports, so that
each percentage point shift in the share of agriculture value added to other
sectors leads to at least two percentages points shift in the labour force from
farm sector to non-farm sector. Maintaining this target itself will inherently
lead to a comparable growth in per capita income of the farm sector.
Agreement on
Agriculture (A-o-A) and India
The success
of the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing has given legitimate boosts and
seriousness to multilateral trading system. Agreement on Textiles and Clothing,
which promised to put an end to the country-by-country quotas on imports of
textiles and clothing imposed by the major developed countries including the
United States and European Union became a reality from January 1, 2005. On the
other hand, the success of the Agreement on Agriculture in liberalizing
agriculture was less than expected but it has opened the door to future
liberalization and concrete results are expected in near future.
Agreement on
Agriculture (A-o-A) or URAA:
The core
objective of A-o-A is to establish a fair and market-oriented agricultural
trading system. Its implementation period was six years for developed countries
and nine for developing countries, starting with the date the agreement came
into effect - January 1, 1995. These dates are now extended under a built-in
provision of A-o-A of own review and renewal. That renegotiation is now
underway, under the terms set at the fourth WTO ministerial conference in Doha
and the Framework Decision agreed at the WTO General Council on August 1, 2004.
The AoA comprises three sections referred to as three pillars of the agreement:
1. Market
access,
2. Domestic
support and
3. Export
subsidies.
However at
the outset, the agreement notes that the reform program should be made in an
equitable way among all Members, having regard to non-trade concerns, including
food security and the need to protect the environment; having regard to the
agreement that special and differential treatment (SDT) for developing
countries is an integral element of the negotiations, and taking into account
the possible negative effects of the implementation of the reform program on
least-developed and net food-importing developing countries. In addition, there
are provisions of Special Products and Sensitive Products, which are to be
exempted from stringent discipline of the above provisions of the A-o- A
Provision of
Special Products designates a certain number of products of the developing
countries that would be exempt from tariff reduction requirements and other
disciplines in order to protect and promote food production, livelihood
security and rural development. The key issues here are associated with the mechanism
to decide on country-w ise crops. In the case of developed countries also,
certain products, based on political, social and cultural considerations are
designated as Sensitive Products, which will be treated less stringently. Here
the main dispute lies between the United States, which has proposed 1 per cent
of the tariff lines for such products while the EU is asking for 8 per cent of
the tariff line.
Market
Access:
The market access requires that tariffs fixed by individual
countries be cut progressively to allow free trade. Since different countries
fixed their tariffs at different levels confronting the interest of each other,
several harmonizing formula such as Uruguay Round formula , Swiss formula,
Girard formula, and Canadian “income tax” formula were suggested to cut tariffs
in which steeper cuts are suggested on higher tariffs, so as to bring all the
international tariffs closer to almost the same level. All these formula have
unique coefficients with different effects. The developed countries preferred
Swiss mathematical Formula in which the coefficients also determine the maximum
tariff where the starting tariffs will end up. For example, if the coefficient
is 20, then a very high starting tariff will end up with a national tariff of
exactly 20 percent and lower starting tariffs will end up proportionately
lower, close to 20 percent as well. The developing countries do not like this
formula because it quickly brings them closure to the competition, a situation
they are not prepared. The key arguments is that the developed countries want
to deprive developing countries a facility that has been extensively used by
them to achieve current state of their economy.
Other
formulae are more flexible. For example the formula used in the Uruguay Round
for agricultural tariff reductions required that tariffs be cut by a percentage
average over a number of years; in that the developed countries agreed to cut
tariffs by an average of 36 percent over six years with a minimum of 15 percent
on each product; some cuts could be greater than others and thus the
combination of average and minimum reductions allows countries the flexibility
to vary their actual tariff reductions on individual products.
Domestic support
and the little boxes
The A-o-A
broadly subdivides domestic support programs into three boxes with colours,
green, blue and amber and two other categories namely Development measures and
de minimis. Under current WTO rules, countries are free to employ subsidies
under the "green" and "blue" boxes, certain development
measures, and the de minimis subsidies. In addition there are some Non-trade concerns
(NTCs) listed in the preamble to the A-o-A, which can be used to legitimize
government programs that run contrary to the market-oriented agricultural
trading system. They include food security, rural development and environmental
protection. The European Union wants to include animal welfare and eco-labeling
as NTCs.
Development
measures cover direct or indirect permitted (A-o-A article 6.2) assistance
aimed at encouraging agricultural and rural development in developing countries
and is allowed. They include investment subsidies generally available to
agriculture such as research and development, extension programs, and soil and
water conservation; and agricultural input subsidies available to low-income or
resource-poor farmers such as fertilizer, water, and electricity. Under the de
minimis provision, developed countries are allowed to use other subsidies with
an aggregate value of up to 5 percent of the total value of domestic
agricultural production in the case of developed countries and 10 per cent in
the case of developing countries.
The Amber
Box (A-o-A Article 6) contains category of domestic support that is scheduled
for reduction based on a formula called the “Aggregate Measure of Support”
(AMS). The AMS calculates the amount of money spent by governments on
agricultural production, except for those contained in the Blue Box, Green Box
and de minimis. It required member countries to report their total AMS for the
period between 1986 and 1988, bind it, and reduce it according to an
agreed-upon schedule. Developed countries agreed to reduce these figures by 20%
over six years starting in 1995. Developing countries agreed to make 13% cuts over 10 years.
Least-developed countries do not need to make any cuts.
Export support
Export support include trade distorting programs such as
Export Subsidy, State Trading Enterprises 2 Export Credits, Special and
Differential Treatment, Special Products, and Sensitive Products aimed at
benefiting the domestic producers against the international competition. A-o-A
tends to eliminate or minimize such supports. Export subsidies are government
payments to the exporting firms directed to encourage use of inputs from the
domestic resources. Accordingly, an export subsidy program will pay the
difference between a more expensive domestic input and a cheaper imported
alternative in order to encourage exporters to buy inputs from domestic market.
Dairy products and sugar in EU continue to receive considerable export
subsidies. The U.S. Step 2 program subsidizes its cotton production through
U.S. exporting firms. Export credits given by a government to underwrite the
cost of doing business on commercial terms also amounts to export subsidy.
Often, the United States is criticized for such policies where the United
States Government gives credit to its domestic companies to deliver goods in
another country but the payments are recovered from the importing countries
government in long instalments and cheaper interest rate making it more
lucrative for the poor countries to import from the United States. This is also
one of the major points of dispute between the United States and the EU and it
is now agreed that such credit line will not exceed 180 days.
Doha
Round:
Brief of the
package encompassing A-o-A .The Fourth WTO Ministerial Conference was held in
Doha , Qatar from 9 to 14 November 2001. In fact, the Doha Ministerial was a
starting of a new round with unique feature foc used on implementation of A-o-A
and “Development” of the developing countries so that they could meaningfully
become part of the agreement.
Article XVII of the GATT 1994 deals with state trading
enterprises and their operations multilateral global trading system. The
following Fifth WTO Ministerial Conference held in Cancun, Mexico from 10 to 14
September 2003 was dedicated to stock taking of progress in negotiations and
other work under the Doha Development Agenda (DDA). However, the DDA required
correcting the imbalances that penalize developing countries and improve the
commitment of WTO members. The modalities3 for the Doha Round are to be
completed by the end of April 2006, the draft schedule based on these
modalities by 31 July 2006 and the Round is expected to conclude by the end of
2006, a date chosen carefully for the Ministerial Meeting when the term of
‘Trade Promotion Authority of the United States’ ends. In this round the latest
Ministerial was held in Hong Kong Ministerial (Dec 13-18, 2005), which has
given some hope for success as for the first time developing countries have
managed to get a mention from developed countries of reduction in their
subsidies otherwise most of the previous commitments have been falsified. The
issues related to implementation of A-o-A dominate the Doha Round and they
include:
1. High
agriculture trade distorting subsidies granted by rich countries.
2.
Agriculture export subsidies .
3. High tariffs on exports of agricultural and
industrial products of interest to developing countries .
However, at
various Ministerial negotiations new items from other agenda have been added to
make it a comprehensive round. For example, the modalities of the A-o-A are
being coupled with GATS, and investment issues. Therefore, the proposals for
negotiation have transformed to include among others the following (list of all
items is provided in following sub-section):
1. On agriculture, 2013 as the end date for
the elimination of export subsidies with an important part frontloaded by 2010 .
2. Agreement that the EU, US and Japan will
undertake the biggest reductions on agricultural subsidies that distort trade
and that these will be effective cuts, which is a serious improvement as
compared to the previous round.
3. On
cotton, which is of key importance to many African countries, export subsidies
on cotton to be eliminated by 2006 and cuts to domestic subsidies will be
greater and faster than for the rest of products.
4. Special
agriculture products and a safeguard to protect those agricultural products of
developing countries with concerns about livelihood security, food security and
rural development .
5. On industrial products, a Swiss formula to
cut tariffs, with high tariffs subject to bigger cuts, thus addressing tariffs
peaks and tariff escalation in particular on products of interest for
developing countries. Developing countries will for a start cut tariffs only in
proportion to the cuts by developed countries.
6. A step forward towards a completely duty-free
and quota -free access for the world poorest country Members of the WTO .
7. On Services, the door has been opened to
plurilateral negotiations .
8. Countries
have started tabling collective requests in the services of sectors that are of
particular interest to them.
9. Aid for
Trade package, to help developing countries address their supply-side
constraints.
India’s
Ministerial Positions at Doha rounds and on A-o-A
Pascal Lamy,
WTO General Secretary visited India on April 5 2006 for the second time in last
six months, which is an indicator of the gravity of problems being faced by
Indians in meeting the demands of developed countries. The Indian position is
that the development agenda and the farmers’ interest cannot be diluted and
that the industrial and agriculture issues should not be mixed, while at the
same time the Indian negotiators feel that no change is made in subsidy
position of the developed countries, yet new elements are being introduced.
Nevertheless the Indian leadership has come up to the age of globalization and
is slowly shedding its defensive posture and it has been demonstrating dynamism
in the WTO negotiations. India rejected the idea of introducing new issues such
as Investment, Competition, Trade Facilitation or Transparency in Government
Procurement, and did not consider the basic trade principles like
non-discrimination or market access
appropriate for dealing with issues like Investment and Competition. The
Minister for Commerce and Industry raised the concerns that sensitive
industries in developing countries including small-scale industries, which
sustain a large labour force, could be destroyed. India was firmly opposed to
any linkage between trade and labour standards and recalled that the Singapore
Declaration had once and for all dealt with this issue and there was no need to
refer to it again. Similarly, on environment, India was strongly opposed to the
use of environmental measures for protectionist purposes and to imposition of
unilateral trade restrictive measures and considered that the existing WTO
rules were adequate to deal with all legitimate environmental concerns. In fact
the Minister termed them as Trojan horses of protectionism.Doha Ministerial was
saved from failure to continue the work program. The African countries,
deserted Indian hopes because they were promised the continuation of their
trade preferences into the EU marke t for some more years. However, to the
windfall pleasure of India, the round was launched with services brought into
the fold of international rules through the General Agreement on Trade in
Services (GATS).
At the
Cancun Ministerial (10-14 September 2003), India felt that the draft Cancún
Ministerial Text was grossly inadequate on implementation issues, precision,
operational and effectiveness and fixing responsibility and would severely
affect the interests of developing countries in agriculture, industrial tariffs
and Singapore issues. There was no progress in removing barriers to export from
developing countries to the developed countries. India argued that all the
time-lines set at Doha for their resolution have been breached. On certain
issues even the mandate itself has been questioned. To make matters worse, the
draft Ministerial text accords low priority to these issues. It does not
envisage any time-frame for taking decisions for resolving outstanding issues.
This is in sharp contrast to the issues of interest to developed countries for
which time-lines have been provided for taking decisions. On agriculture
subsidies, India argued that the prevailing subsidies in the developed
countries were not targeted to keeping small struggling family farms in business but to provide hefty rents to
large farmers or corporates. On the other hand, against equity, justice and
fair play, developing countries are being asked to liberalize their
agriculture. India felt there was an urgent need to bring down the high tariffs
and non-tariff barriers on products of export interest to developing countries
while ensuring that special and differential treatment for developing countries
and policy space to deal with sensitive products remain an integral part of all
elements of negotiations. India reiterates that under no circumstances can it
accept any form or harmonization of tariffs in agriculture or obligations to
create and expand tariff rate quotas.
On market
access negotiations on non-agricultural products (NAMA), India favored the
formula mandated by the Doha Declaration, without any amendment in any aspect
of the formula.
Contentious
issues and on-going Debate
The main
complaint about policies supporting domestic prices, subsidized production and
subsidised exports is that they encourage over-production. This works as
deterrent to imports and promotes low-priced dumping on world markets. However,
there are also arguments in favour of subsidies, particularly in the case of
net importers of agriculture products. Such countries do benefit from imports
at suppressed prices, (see for example (Panagariya, 2005). Nevertheless,
depending on prolonged food aid program could render a country net importer of
food due to the dependency created by circumstances and could discourage
domestic production. Once such a vicious circle is created it becomes difficult
to come out of it.
Agriculture
subsidies
About 84
percent of farmer households in India survive with less than 2.0 hectare of
land with average size of their holding being 0.63 hectare, while average size
of all holdings in India is just about 1.4 hectare. Survival of such farmers is
at stake if they do not get alternative means of livelihood. Where will these
farmers get employment if Indian markets are flooded with foreign agricultural
products under the market access program?
In India the product-specific support is negative, while the non-product
specific support i.e., subsidies on agricultural inputs, such as, power,
irrigation, fertilisers etc., is well below the permissible level of 10 per
cent of the value of agricultural output. Therefore, India is under no
obligation to reduce domestic support currently extended to the agricultural
sector. Yet, subsidies are wisely considered burden in India and they are being
rationalized. On the other hand, domestic subsidies in OECD countries during
2002 accounted for about US$ 226.5 billion (Table 6), which has increased to
US$279.5 billion in 2004. United States spent US$4 billion as subsidy to
support its 25,000 cotton producers (US$160, 000 per producer) in 2003. 4
It is also
argued that in countries such as United States, subsidies are enjoyed by a
selected few, mostly producing corn, wheat, cotton, soybean, and rice, while
growers of 400 other crops hardly get any such subsidy. Because of income and
price support programs, the farmers in OECD countries are reported to use high
levels of pesticides, fertilizers and herbicides in order to increase
productivity of the land and maximize profits. But, these acts also lead to
pollution of rivers and lakes. Therefore, in overall assessment, it is argued
that the social benefits of subsidies may be much less and deserve to be
curtailed (Cooper 2004) and also see information uploaded at
www.ewg.org/farm/). Table (6) compares 2002 values of subsidy for India and
selected OECD countries. Subsidy constitutes almost 54 percent of the
agriculture value added in OECD as compared to seven per cent in India. This
figure will further go down when taken as percentage of value of agriculture
output. Opposition to subsidy is also from within than outside. In the case of
United States six reasons are promoted to kill farm subsidy: (1) Lower Food
Prices for American Families, (2) Lower Costs and increased Exports for
American Companies, (3) Budget Savings and Equity for the U.S. Tax Payers, (4)
More Environment friendly Land Use, (5) Lager Market for U.S. Farmers
Oxfam,
“Agriculture Dumping in Africa.” July 8, 2003.
Economic Diversification for Rural America,
and (6) A more Hospitable World (Griswold, Slivinsy and Preble 2006).It is not
that, the farmers in OECD countries will become jobless if subsidies are removed.
The population dependency on farm is extremely thin in these countries. It is
not like India, where more than 60 per cent of the population depends on farm.
In OECD countries the farmers can easily switch to better options quickly as
demonstrated in New Zealand, which was heavily subsidizing its sheep farmers
until 1984. The sheep farm subsidy was completely removed within a span of one
year after 1984 and today New Zealand is one of the least subsidized countries
among OECD countries, with a subsidy incidence of just about 0.3 billion (3 per
cent of total farm receipt as compared to 30 per cent in OECD)5 in 2004.
India’s
Readiness: Agriculture Policy Regime
As a general
policy of trade reforms in India, some 1,400 quantitative restrictions including
those on agriculture products were replaced by the custom tariffs. While tariff
rates have been declining and aimed to achieve the level of ASEAN countries,
the average MFN tariff7 is still over 20 per cent. However, almost all the
tariff lines in the case of agriculture are bound 8
The MFN
tariff is based on “standard” rates of duty, which are statutory tariffs and
may only be changed through legislation. Binding plays an important role in signalling
to the business community an upper limit for possible tariff increases. As a
result of the Uruguay Round negotiations, India had bound about 67 per cent of
its tariff lines, while applied tariff were kept below bound rates.
Subsequently, India submitted rectification and modifications of its schedule
under Article XXVIII: 1 of the GATT, 1994 and increased the number of bound
tariffs from 67%, to 72.4% in 2001. Bindings have been undertaken for
previously unbound products, such as textiles and clothing, while India
renegotiated some commitments on previously bound . applied tariff on
agriculture products in 2004 was about 49 per cent while the average bound rate
was 125 per cent. In addition, anti-dumping measures have become an important
element in India's trade policy.With the removal of QRs on India’s imports,
apprehensions have been expressed that such removal may impact the domestic
producers adversely and result in a surge and dumping of imports into the
country. However, necessary mechanisms have been put in place to provide
adequate protection and a level playing field to domestic players vis-à-vis
imports. Appropriate tariffication, at peak customs duty, have been effected
for these QRs. A number of agricultural and horticultural products placed on
the free list of imports in earlier years have also been brought to the peak
rate to ensure adequate protection to Indian farmers. Tariff binding for such
products have also been renegotiated at substantially higher levels. For
sensitive agricultural products, suitable enabling provision has been made to
fix the statutory tariff rates at appropriate high levels. It has also been
decided to amend the 1992 Foreign Trade (Development & Regulation) Act for
vesting the Government with necessary powers to impose QRs as a temporary
safeguard measure. EXIM Policy announced on 31.3.2001 further provides for the
following measures to protect the domestic producers: Import of agricultural products like wheat,
rice, maize, other coarse cereals, copra and coconut oil has been placed in the
category of State Trading. The nominated State Trading Enterprise will conduct
the imports of these commodities solely as per commercial considerations.
Similarly, import of petroleum products including petrol, diesel and ATF has
also been placed in the category of State Trading. Import of urea will also be
done through the mechanism of State Trading.Imports have also been made subject
to various existing domestic regulations like Food Adulteration Act and Rules
there under, Meat Food Product Order, Tea Waste (Control Order) and import of textile
material using the prohibited dyes has been banned. To ensure that import of
agricultural products do not lead to unwanted Infiltration of exotic diseases
and pests in the country, it has been decided to subject imports of all primary
products of plant and animal origin to ëBio .Security & Sanitary and
Phyto-Sanitary Permití. Import of foreign liquor, processed food products and
tea wastes have been subjected to already existing domestic regulations
concerning health and hygiene.
. What are the main features of the WTO Agreement
on Agriculture which are of concern to India?
. The main
features of the WTO Agreement in Agriculture which are of concern to India are:
i)
India
has been maintaining Quantitative Restrictions (QRs) on import of 825
agricultural products as on 1.4.1997. Under the provisions of the Agreement,
such Quantitative Restrictions will have to be eliminated. India has sought to remove
them in three phases within an overall time frame of six years upto 31.3.2003.
These Quantitative Restrictions will have to be replaced with appropriate
tariffs.
ii)
ii)
The Agreement also imposes constraints on the level of domestic support
provided to the agricultural sector. In India’s case, it may have in future
some implications on minimum support prices given to farmers and on the
subsidies given on agricultural inputs. However, the Agreement allows us to
provide domestic supportto the extent of 10% of the total value of agricultural
produce.
iii)
Disciplines on export subsidy do not affect us
as India is not providing any export subsidy on agricultural products.
iv) The Agreement allows unlimited support
to activities such as (i) research, pest diseases control, training, extension,
and advisoryservices; (ii) public stock holding for food security purposes;
(iii) domestic food aid; and (iv) Income insurance and food needs, relief from
natural disasters and payments under the environmental assistance programmes.
Moreover, investment subsidies given for development of agricultural infrastructure
or any kind of support given to low income and resource poor farmers are exempt
from any commitments. Most of our major rural and agricultural development
programmes are covered under these provisions. Therefore, the Agreement does
not constrain our policies of investments in these areas.
Conclusion
Though India
has demonstrated that there exists broad political support to its economic
reform programme, as has been proved by the transition of several Governments
in the last decade through the political space, agricultural trade policy
reforms need to be accelerated much more than what has been done so far. The
challenge is to mitigate the inefficiency that exists in the Indian agriculture
to close the gap between its potential and actual performances through a proper
policy framework. India being a net exporter in agriculture products, it has
more to gain from the trade reforms. It has sufficiently high bound rates on
most of the products and therefore, flexibility can be ensured against unfair
competition. India does not have to worry about its subsidy, as it is already below
the required line and it also does not have any domestic support to recon with.
All these place India in an advantageous position. Moreover, the ongoing negotiations
are likely to yield enough flexibility in product choice and tariff selection.
A multilateral trading system is in the interest of India, given the fact that
it is placed in such a situation where no clear group fits well. Therefore,
India should work towardthe success of the Doha round and in the mean time make
use of the opportunity to reform its domestic market to bring in more
efficiency. The interests of India are certainly at variance from the common
interest of least developed countries, which became amply clear during the
Tokyo and Doha Ministerials, when the least developed countries left India
alone. Many of these countries are net importers of food and the subsidy in the
exporting countries makes them better off. Moreover, under the Everything But
Arms (EBA) initiative of the European Union, the LDCs have quota- and duty-free
access to the EU market9, a facility that was never available to India. The
services sector for India is critical to its growth and increasing the pace of
industrial growth is its necessity. With favourable bound rates for agriculture
onboard, the Negotiating framework of India must be different from that of
other developing
countries.
The situation is highly tenacious for India, particularly in view of the fact
that the developed countries have managed to link agriculture subsidy with the
market access in services and industry. If the European Union needs to do more
on agricultural tariffs, and the US needs to do more on reducing agricultural
subsidies, then the G-20 group of countries, where India is a key member, are
also needed to do more on industrial tariffs. This is a hard ball game.
Moreover, all these issues are dynamically linked to the future agenda of the
WTO inter-alia in terms of substantial opening up trade in services; rules governing
transparency in bilateral trade agreements, anti-dumping and Traditionally,
India has fallen prey to the group dynamics because its interests do not fully
confirm to the least developed countries, whose cause it used to champion nor
does it radically differ from those of developed countries, who it confronts.
Therefore, the time has come for India to come out of ambiguity and take a
rational step in the negotiation process to harness best of its own interests. Some
sacrifices are worth taking in order to gain a wider market.
References
Anderson, Kym and Martin, Will (eds)
2005 Agricultural Trade Reform and the
Doha Development Agenda, New York:
The World Bank and Palgrave
Macmillan.
Bathla, Seema 2006 'Trade Policy
Reforms and Openness of Indian Agriculture:
Analysis at the Comodity Level',
South Asia Economic Journal 7(1): 19-53.
Bhagwati, Jagdish 2005 'From Seattle
to Hong Kong', Foreign Affairs December
2005 -- WTO Special Edition.
Birthal, P.S., Joshi, P.K. and
Gulati, A. 2005 'High Value Food Commodities
and Vertical Coordination in India:
Implications for Smallholders."' Toward
High-Value Agriculture and Vertical
Coordination: Implications for
Agribusiness and Smallholders,
National Agricultural Science Centre, Pusa,
New Delhi, 7 March 2005.
Cooper, Sarah Fitzgerald 2004 'A
Tough Row to Hoe', Research Reports:
American Institute for Economic
Research LXXI(18): 101-10
ASSIGNMENT
OF DEVELOPMENT ECO AND INDIAN ECONOMY.
HARSH
VARDHAN PATHAK.
SSE-I-09.
MSC
INTEGRATED ECO.
BATCH
2011.
